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Articles
Appointments by the Legislature
Under the Rhode Island Separation
of Powers Doctrine:
The Hazards of the Road Less
Traveled*
Sheldon Whitehouse**
1. INTRODUCTION'
For over a century, the United States Supreme Court has for-
bidden Congress from making appointments to offices outside the
legislative branch of government.2 James Madison said: "The
power of the legislature to appoint any other than their own of-
ficers, departs too far from the theory which requires a separation
of the great Departments of Government."3 Conversely, Rhode Is-
land's General Assembly has for that century and more exercised
* With apologies to Robert Frost. See Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken, in
You Come Too 84 (5th ed. 1962).
** B.A. Yale University, 1978; J.D. University of Virginia School of Law,
1982. Sheldon Whitehouse is United States Attorney for the District of Rhode Is-
land. He was previously Director of Business Regulation, Executive Counsel to
Governor Bruce Sundlun and the Governor's Director of Policy. This article re-
flects his own views.
1. Portions of this article appeared in Sheldon Whitehouse, The Impetuous
Vortex, 43 R.I.B.J. 7, (Apr. 1995).
2. See infra Part 2.D.
3. Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787, 452
(1969) (quoting from 6 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 331 (Julian Boyd ed.,
1950)).
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virtually unchecked appointment powers. 4 In 1989, presented with
the question whether legislative appointments5 offend the Rhode
Island Constitution, the Rhode Island Supreme Court avoided this
constitutional issue.6 The Coastal Resources Management Coun-
cil, with eight members appointed by the legislature, survived
scrutiny on the basis of a procedural ruling that the trial judge had
"no standing to attack the constitutionality of the statute."7 This
year, the Court was presented again with the same question. Di-
vided 2 to 2 on the constitutional question, the court was again
unable to answer.8 With three legislators sitting as members, the
Judicial Tenure and Discipline Commission survived scrutiny on
the basis of a procedural ruling that in a tie vote "the presumption
of constitutionality prevails."9
Two possible roads diverge from the even split on the court.
One would necessarily be the road of federal jurisprudence, cus-
tomarily taken by the Rhode Island Supreme Court in separation
of powers cases. 10 The other would permit these legislative ap-
pointments to continue, presumably relying on state precedents
and history." If proper separation of the powers is "essential to
4. The General Assembly presently exerts its influence through appoint-
ments to the Rhode Island Lottery Commission, the Retirement Board, the State
Investment Commission, the Committee on Judicial Tenure and Discipline, the
Port Authority and Economic Development Corporation, the Water Resources
Board, the Coastal Resources Management Council, the Solid Waste Management
Corporation, the Capital Center Commission, the Narragansett Bay Water Quality
Management District Commission, the Public Transit Authority, and the Unclassi-
fied Pay Plan Board, to name a few. A bill presently before the Rhode Island Gen-
eral Assembly would bring the independent Public Utilities Commission under
legislative control with a majority of legislative appointments. See infra Appendix,
Partial Listing of Agencies With Members Appointed By the Legislature.
5. The appointments at issue are those made by members of the legislature,
usually the Speaker of the House and/or Majority Leader of the Senate, to posi-
tions in independent state agencies, boards and commissions that execute some
non-legislative function. See infra note 75. The appointees may be members of the
legislature themselves, or members of the public. If the appointment authority
resides in the legislature, they are here deemed "legislative appointments."
6. Easton's Point Ass'n v. Coastal Resources Management Council, 522 A.2d
199 (R.I. 1987).
7. Id. at 202.
8. In re Commission on Judicial Tenure and Discipline, 670 A.2d 1232 (R.I.
1996).
9. Id. at 1234.
10. See infra Part 3.A
11. See infra Parts 3.B-3.C.
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the successful working of this system,"12 which road will be taken
is a vital question for Rhode Island.
This article looks at the two roads, where they come from, why
they diverge, and where they lead. Part Two reviews the federal
history and jurisprudence and establishes that separation of pow-
ers is our nation's "first principle."13 Next, this article identifies the
legislature as the greatest threat to properly separated powers,1 4
and describes the vital importance given to the power of appoint-
ment in separation of powers analysis.' 5 Part Three describes our
somewhat unique Rhode Island history. It demonstrates Rhode Is-
land's general adherence to federal separation of powers jurispru-
dence and contrasts this with the apparent stress felt for decades
by Rhode Island courts where the legislative appointment power is
concerned, 16 and offers an example of the practical harm caused
by these appointments. Section Four summarizes the decisions of
other state courts, which usually forbid legislative appointments
under separation of powers doctrine. Finally, this article concludes
that Rhode Island's choice is one of great importance and that
while we may not be required to follow the federal constitution,
both our state constitution and basic principles of good government
demand that we take that direction.
2. THE FEDERAL HIGHWAY: SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
A. Our "First Principle": Separated Government Powers in
American Democracy.
The United States Constitution vests, in Article I, "[a]ll legis-
lative powers ... in a Congress of the United States;" in Article II,
the executive power is "vested in a President of the United States
of America," who is charged to "take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed;" and in Article III, the judicial power is vested in a
Supreme Court, and lower courts to be established by the legisla-
ture. The separation of powers thereby accomplished is the "na-
tional fundamental law,"' 7 and is "sacred."' 8
12. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 191 (1881).
13. See infra Part 2.A.
14. See infra Part 2.B.
15. See infra Part 2.C.
16. See infra Parts 3.A-3C.
17. J.W. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928).
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It was the "central judgment of the Framers of the Constitu-
tion that, within our political scheme, the separation of govern-
mental powers into three coordinate Branches is essential to the
preservation of liberty."19 James Madison, writing about the prin-
ciple of separate powers, said: "No political truth is certainly of
greater intrinsic value or is stamped with the authority of more
enlightened patrons of liberty .... "20 Thomas Jefferson called it
"the first principle of a good government." 21 Even George Wash-
ington, in his farewell address, left a warning of the dangers of
encroachment across the separated powers: "The spirit of en-
croachment tends to consolidate the powers of all the departments
in one, and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real
despotism."22 In short, the separation of powers is our highest
governmental principle.23
18. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116 (1926) (quoting from 1 James
Madison, Annals of Congress, 581 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
19. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
20. The Federalist No. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961).
21. Wood, supra note 3 at 549, 604.
22. Book v. State Office Bldg. Comm., 149 N.E.2d 273, 294 (1958) (quoting
Thomas Jefferson). See also Irving Younger, Congressional Investigations and Ex-
ecutive Secrecy: A Study in the Separation of Powers, 22 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 755, 758
(1959).
23. The litany of emphasis on this principle is extensive and profound. See,
e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988) ("Time and again we have reaf-
firmed the importance in our broad constitutional scheme of the separation of gov-
ernmental powers into the three coordinate branches."); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 951 (1983) (reasoning that the Constitution created three defined Branches
"to assure, as nearly as possible, that each branch of government would confine
itself to its assigned responsibility."); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 725 (1986)
(separated powers are crucial in our system); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States,
295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) ("The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the
three general departments of government entirely free from the control or coercive
influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others, has often been stressed and is
hardly open to serious question."); O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530
(1933) ([ejach department should be kept completely independent of the others...
in the sense that the acts of each shall never be controlled by, or subjected, directly
or indirectly, to, the coercive influence of either of the other departments.");
Springer v. Gov't of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201 (1928) ("This separa-
tion and the consequent exclusive character of the powers conferred upon each of
these departments is basic and vital - not merely a matter of governmental mech-
anism."); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) ("The general rule is
that neither department may invade the province of the other and neither may
control, direct or restrain the action of the other."); 1 The Works of James Wilson
367 (James DeWitt Andrews ed., 1896) (arguing each department's proceedings
.should be free from the remotest influence, direct or indirect, of either of the two
other powers.") quoting O'Donoghue, 289 U.S. at 530; 1 James Bryce, The Ameri-
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The historical antecedents of this great principle include
Baron Charles de Montesquieu's The Spirit of the Laws.24 He
warned, "When the legislative and executive powers are united in
the same person or body, there can be no liberty."25 Separated gov-
ernment powers was a cause championed also by John Locke26 and
Sir William Blackstone,27 and the merits of this cause had the "full
approval" of the Founding Fathers. 28
The significance of properly separated governmental powers is
deeply practical: "[w]e have not yet found a better way to preserve
freedom than by making the exercise of power subject to the care-
fully crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution."29
can Commonwealth 288 (1888) ("this separation is the merit which the Philadel-
phia Convention chiefly sought to attain.").
24. Charles de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws 157 (Anne M. Cohler et al.
eds. & trans., 1989) (1748).
25. This statement is described in The Federalist No. 47 (James Madison) as
"this celebrated maxim of this celebrated author." See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
120 (1976). Montesquieu's full statement is related in John Devlin, Toward a State
Constitutional Analysis of Allocation of Powers: Legislators and Legislative Ap-
pointees Performing Administrative Functions, 66 Temp. L. Rev. 1205 at n. 91:
Political liberty in a citizen is that tranquillity of spirit which comes
from the opinion each one has of his security, and in order for him to have
his liberty the government must be such that one citizen cannot fear an-
other citizen.
When legislative power is united with executive power in a single per-
son or in a single body of magistracy, there is no liberty, because one can
fear that the same monarch or senate that makes tyrannical laws will
execute them tyrannically.
Nor is there liberty if the power of judging is not separate from legis-
lative power and from executive power. If it were joined to legislative
power, the power over life and liberty of the citizens would be arbitrary,
for the judge would be the legislator. If it were joined to executive power,
the judge could have the force of an oppressor.
Id.
26. 2 John Locke, Two Treatises of Civil Government Ch. XII (1690).
27. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 146 (7th ed.
1775)
28. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116 (1926).
29. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983); accord Metro. Washington Airports
Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Airport Noise, 501 U.S. 252, 272 (1991)
("[uiltimate purpose of this separation of powers is to protect the liberty and secur-
ity of the governed."); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 380 ("essential to the preservation of
liberty."); Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 721 (declared purpose "was to diffus[e] power the
better to secure liberty.") (citations omitted). See also Younger, supra note 22 at
755 ("A tendency to corruption, then, is a characteristic of politics and the price of
civilization. Containment of that tendency is one end of government: to achieve it,
the new nation needed a shrewdly constructed constitution.").
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B. The "Impetuous Vortex": Dangers of the Legislative Branch.
While there is "hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the
separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power,"30 of the
separate branches, the legislature has earned the closest scrutiny.
First of all, the legislature is the dominant branch. 31 Conse-
quently, "[t]he dangers of congressional usurpation of executive
branch functions have long been recognized."3 2 James Bryce in
The American Commonwealth noted "that every legislature tends
to so enlarge its power as to encroach on the executive." 33 He
called this the legislature's "passion for extending its authority."34
30. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
31. The Federalist No. 51, at 350 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961) ("In
republican government the legislative authority, necessarily, predominates.").
32. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 727. Our bitter historical experience in the years
between the Revolution and the Constitution, an interval when state legislatures
ruled unchecked, justified particular caution about the legislature:
Under British rule, the Colonies suffered the abuses of unchecked execu-
tive power that were attributed, at least popularly, to a hereditary monar-
chy. During the Confederation, the States reacted by removing power
from the executive and placing it in the hands of elected legislators. But
many legislators proved to be little better than Crown. The supremacy of
legislatures came to be recognized as the supremacy of faction and the
tyranny of shifting majorities. The legislatures confiscated property, er-
ected paper money schemes, [and] suspended the ordinary means of col-
lecting debts.
It was to prevent the recurrence of such abuses that the Framers
vested the executive, legislative, and judicial powers in separate
branches.
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 960-962 (citations omitted); see also Edward Levi, Some As-
pects of Separation of Powers, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 371, 374-6 (1976) ("The legisla-
tures had assumed great power, and their rule - for a variety of reasons - was
unstable. The supremacy of legislatures cause to be recognized as the supremacy
of faction and the tyranny of shifting majorities."); Wood, supra note 23 at 380
(citing the "profuse, hastily drawn, capricious, confused and unjust legislation of
the 1780's"). Thomas Jefferson described his experience in the Virginia legislature
thusly:
All the powers of government, legislative, executive and judiciary, result
to the legislative body. The concentrating of these in the same hands, is
precisely the definition of despotic government. It will be no alleviation,
that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands, and not by a
single one. One hundred and seventy-three despots would surely be as
oppressive as one .... And little will it avail us that they are chosen by
ourselves. An elective despotism was not the government we fought for.
The Federalist No. 48 at 252 (James Madison) (Wills ed.) (quoting from Thomas
Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia); see Wood, supra note 23 at 451-452.
33. Bryce, supra note 23 at 297.
34. Id. at 303. President Truman agreed. He said: "Unless this principle is
observed, it is impossible to have orderly government. The legislative power will
[Vol. 1:1
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For these and other reasons, the Framers recognized the "par-
ticular danger of the Legislative Branch's accreting to itself judi-
cial or executive power."35 As James Madison stated,
... The legislative department is everywhere extending
the sphere of its activity, and drawing all powers into its im-
petuous vortex.
* . . [I]t is against the enterprising ambition of this de-
partment, that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy
and exhaust all their precautions.
• . . Its constitutional powers being at once more exten-
sive and less susceptible of precise limits, it can with the
greater facility, mask under complicated and indirect meas-
ures, the encroachments which it makes on the co-ordinate
departments. 36
Alexander Hamilton as well warned of "[the propensity of the
legislative department to intrude upon the rights, and to absorb
the powers, of the other departments."37 In sum, as the Supreme
Court has concluded, "the debates of the Constitutional Conven-
tion, and the Federalist Papers, are replete with expressions of
fear that the Legislative Branch of the national government will
aggrandize itself at the expense of the other two branches."38
ooze into the executive offices. It will influence and corrupt the decisions of the
executive branch. It will affect promotions and transfers. It will warp and twist
policies." Younger, supra note 29 at 783, quoting from Barth, Government by In-
vestigation 218 (1955).
35. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 382.
36. The Federalist No. 48, at 332-334 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961).
See Metropolitan, 501 U.S. at 273-274.
37. The Federalist No. 73, at 442 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
38. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 129. Historians relate that the change in American
sentiments about the legislatures in the interval between the Revolution of 1776
and the Constitution of 1789 reflected more than just bitter experience, but a
change in the American conception of society. See generally Wood, supra note 23.
Under the colonial regime, the people were seen as one of three estates of the
realm, represented by the House of Commons in English Parliament in a struggle
of interests defined by social class against the Lords and the Crown. In the
Revolution, Americans instinctively identified themselves with the Commons, and
undertook to defend themselves against Lords and Crown. By the time the Consti-
tution was drafted, it had become apparent to Americans that we, the people, were
all commoners, and that it was not necessary to design American government to
defend against Lords and Crown. The Federalist No. 48, at 251 (James Madison)
(Wills ed.). Rather, the genius of the Constitution was to protect individuals
against the dangers of faction and shifting majorities in an egalitarian society. In
1996]
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C. A "Bright Line": Appointments to Office Under the
Separation of Powers Doctrine.
Although separation of powers is not an area much given to
"bright line" analysis, 39 there is a bright federal line that forbids
legislative appointments. Even statutory schemes that "might
prove to be innocuous" offend the Constitution where they "pro-
vide[ ] a blueprint for extensive expansion of the legislative power
beyond its constitutionally confined role."40 The oft-quoted pas-
sage from Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,41 enjoining "interdependence" and
"reciprocity" upon the branches, 42 has never permitted appoint-
ments by Congress to independent or executive agencies. As the
following sections will demonstrate, here the line is clearly drawn.
Legislative appointments to offices outside the legislative
branch are an encroachment on the other powers,43 feared specifi-
this vision, the legislature, which immediately works the prevailing popular will,
was recognized as the most dangerous branch. Cf. Walt Kelly, Pogo ("We have met
the enemy and he is us."). As one famous observer of the American scene noted:
Men come and go, but an assembly goes on forever; it is immortal, because
while members change, the policy, the passion for extending its authority,
the tenacity in clinging to what has once been gained, remain persistent.
... Its pressure is steady and continuous; it is always, by a sort of natural
process, expanding its own powers and devising new methods for fettering
its rival.
Bryce, supra note 23 at 303-304.
39. Commodity Futures Trading Comm. v. Schorr, 478 U.S. 833, 851, 857
(1986).
40. Metropolitan, 501 U.S. at 277; see also Fed. Election Commission v. NRA
Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 115 S.Ct.
537 (1994).
41. 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)
42. "While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also
contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable
government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, au-
tonomy but reciprocity." Id. See also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381
(1989) (reasoning "a hermetic division among the Branches" not required); Nixon
v. Adm'r of Gen. Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1976) (rejecting "airtight depart-
ments of government"); 1 James Landis, The Administrative Process (1938) (one
cannot "distinguish minutely and definitively between these powers"); The Feder-
alist No. 37, at 235 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961) (noting "the obscurity
which reigns in these subjects, and which puzzles the greatest adepts in political
science").
43. It should be recognized that the three great Powers - Legislative, Execu-
tive and Judicial - are each capable of performing internal legislative, executive
and judicial functions. The usual terminology that recognizes the proper internal
use of one of these functions by a coordinate power is the prefix "quasi". A state
[Vol. 1:1
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cally by the Founding Fathers.44 Mr. Madison said in the First
Congress,
The powers relative to offices are partly legislative and partly
executive. The legislature creates the office, defines the pow-
ers, limits its duration and annexes a compensation. This
done, the legislative power ceases. They ought to have noth-
ing to do with designating the man to fill the office.45
Madison warned, "[i]f there is any point in which the separation of
the legislative and executive powers ought to be maintained with
great caution, it is that which relates to officers and offices." 46 The
Framers concluded from this history that "[tihe proper cure ... for
corruption in the legislature was to take from it the power of ap-
pointment to office." 47
The duty to resolve questions of separation of powers falls to
the judicial branch.48 The principle of judicial review was estab-
lished to "defend the constitution against violations by the other
departments, particularly the legislature."49 As the following sec-
tion demonstrates, the United States Supreme Court has been
faithful to the Framers' concern. Each time Congress has arro-
legislature exercises a "quasi-executive" function in the hiring and supervision of
its own employees. An executive agency exercises a "quasi-judicial" function when
it holds a contested hearing. An appellate court exercises a "quasi-legislative"
function when it establishes local rules of conduct and procedure. An independent
agency may perform legislative, judicial and executive functions in this manner. 1
J. Stein et al., Administrative Law, §§ 4.10-4.14; see also Fed. Trade Comm'n v.
Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487-488 (1952) (Jackson, J. dissenting).
44. A reason for this particular concern over appointments was the Crown's
historic use of patronage appointments and pensions to influence voting in the
Houses of Parliament. This interference was the predominant "separation of pow-
ers" concern at the time of the Revolution. See Wood, supra note 23 at 33, 143-149,
157, 407, 435, 488; see also, Bryce, supra note 23 at 298 n.1. As the Founders'
concern over the alarming practices of state legislatures grew, it was observed that
"vesting the power of appointment to offices . . . in the legislature destroyed all
responsibility and created a perpetual source of faction and corruption." Wood,
supra note 23 at 435 (internal quotations omitted). In the Revolutionary era, "cor-
ruption" was a term of art in the political science of separated powers. Id. at 32-33.
45. Myers, 272 U.S. at 128. See also The Federalist No. 51 (Alexander
Hamilton).
46. Myers, 272 U.S. at 116, quoting James Madison in 1 Annals of Congress
581 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
47. Bryce, supra note 23 at 551.
48. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
49. Wood, supra note 22 at 462; see also The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander
Hamilton) ("[clourts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited
constitution against legislative encroachments.").
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gated to itself the power of appointment, the United States
Supreme Court has rebuffed the encroachment under the broad
principle of separation of governmental powers. 50
D. Judicial Bulwarks: United States Supreme Court
Appointments Decisions.
Over a century ago, Congress created a commission to develop
Rock Creek Park in the District of Columbia, and appointed to it
the Chief of Engineers of the United States Army and the Engineer
Commissioner of the District of Columbia. 51 The Supreme Court
upheld the designation of the engineers to the park commission on
grounds that Congress was merely devolving additional functions
ex officio on an executive office, and not making legislative appoint-
ments. The Shoemaker decision stated the maxim: "while Con-
gress may create an office, it cannot appoint the officer."52
The sockdolager came in Springer v. Gov't of the Philippine Is-
lands,53 in which the Court addressed appointments by the Philip-
pine Islands legislature to boards of directors of the National Coal
Company, the National Bank, the National Petroleum Company,
the National Development Company, the National Cement Com-
pany, and the National Iron Company of the Philippines. The
Court applied the American constitutional model to the provisional
government of the Philippines and rejected these legislative ap-
pointments as violating the principle of separation of governmen-
tal powers. The Springer Court said that the separation of powers
principle was the "general rule inherent in the American constitu-
50. See Metropolitan, 501 U.S. at 277 n. 23.
Because we invalidate the Board of Review under basic separation-of-
powers principles, we need not address respondents' claim that Members
of Congress serve on the Board in violation of the Incompatibility and In-
eligibility Clauses. See U.S. Const., Art. I, § 6. We also express no opinion
on whether the appointment process of the Board of Review contravenes
the Appointments Clause, U.S. Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Id. Reliance on broad separation of powers principles is common to all of the ap-
pointments decisions, as the following section demonstrates.
51. Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 284 (1893).
52. Id. at 300.
53. 277 U.S. 189 (1928).
APPOINTMENTS BY THE LEGISLATURE
tional system,"54 and specifically refused to found its decision on
narrow or individual constitutional provisions:
Some of our state Constitutions expressly provide in one form
or another that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers
of government shall be forever separate and distinct from
each other. Other Constitutions, including that of the United
States, do not contain such an express provision. But it is
implicit in all, as a conclusion logically following from the
separation of the several departments. 55
Reliance on broad separation of powers principles to decide ap-
pointments cases continued through Myers v. United States, 56
Humphrey's Executor v. United States,5 7 and Wiener v. United
States,58 which together held that Congress cannot exercise any
removal authority over appointees outside the legislative branch,
but can by the establishment of terms of office restrict a president's
removal of appointees to independent agencies.
54. Id. at 201-202; accord Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 629-630 ("[ilmplied in
the very fact of the separation of the powers of these departments by the
Constitution.").
55. Springer, 277 U.S. at 201. The foundation for Springer's rejection of the
legislative appointments was an American principle presumably common to state
constitutions. This suggests that legislative appointments must offend state con-
stitutions as well. However, state legislative authority is "plenary," see Town of
Lincoln v. Lincoln Lodge No. 22, 660 A.2d 710, 715 (R.I. 1995); City of Pawtucket v.
Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 44 (R.I. 1995), while Congress' is not. Thus the argument
may be made that a state legislature must have more authority to appoint than
has Congress. This argument has surface appeal, but shrivels under scrutiny.
The argument's flaw is that it confuses two separate doctrines. Federalism is the
doctrine that prohibits certain areas of substantive jurisdiction to Congress and
leaves them exclusively to the states. Principles of federalism limit Congress' ple-
nary authority to those areas that are proper for Congress to legislate. Cf. United
States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995). State legislatures' plenary authority is not
so limited. However, this fact bears not at all on principles of separation of powers,
and the two should not be confused. Even where plenary power is exercised, its
exercise must still yield to separation of powers requirements. "Congress has ple-
nary authority in all areas in which it has substantive legislative jurisdiction."
M'Culloch v. State, 17 U.S. 316 (1819); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 133. Yet it
must still yield to separation of powers principles in those areas. Buckley, 424 U.S.
at 132-133; see also Bryce, supra note 23 at 43-45. In a nutshell, the "first princi-
ple," separation of powers, trumps "plenariness," not vice versa.
56. 272 U.S. at 161 (appointments held to be executive under duty to faith-
fully execute the laws).
57. 295 U.S. 602, 629-630 (1935) (holding Congress has power to limit execu-
tive power to remove administrative officials by establishing terms of office).
58. 357 U.S. 349 (1958) (following Humphrey's Ex'r).
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The next major decision on legislative appointments was
Buckley v. Valeo.59 Congress established the Federal Election
Commission, of whose eight members two were appointed by the
President pro tempore of the Senate, and two by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.6 0 Defining the question as whether the
legislative appointment of those members "runs afoul of the sepa-
ration of powers embedded in the Constitution,"61 the Court
turned to "the fundamental principles of the Government estab-
lished by the Framers of the Constitution" and struck down the
appointments. 62 In the wake of Buckley, Congress sought to reest-
ablish its appointments to the Commission. The new members
were ex officio, and exercised no voting power. These appointments
too were rejected, as "their mere presence as agents of Congress
conveys a tacit message to the other commissioners. The message
may well be an entirely appropriate one - but it nevertheless has
the potential to influence the other commissioners." 63
The Court of Appeals that rejected the new appointments
elaborated:
Congress must limit the exercise of its influence, whether in
the form of advice or not, to its legislative role. In that capac-
ity, Congress enjoys ample channels to advise, coordinate,
and even directly influence an executive agency. It can do so
through oversight hearings, appropriation and authorization
legislation, or direct communication with the Commission.
What the Constitution prohibits Congress from doing, and
what Congress does in this case, is to place its agents "beyond
the legislative sphere" by naming them to membership on an
entity with executive powers. 64
59. 424 U.S. at 113
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 120, 143.
63. Fed. Election Comm'n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 826 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (the Constitution "imposes a structural ban on legislative intrusions
into other governmental functions," 6 F.3d at 827, and so "the mere presence of
agents of Congress on an entity with executive powers offends the Constitution.")
cert. dismissed, 115 S.Ct. 537 (1994).
64. Id. (citations and footnote omitted); accord Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 733
("[o]nce Congress makes its choice in enacting legislation, its participation ends.
Congress can thereafter control the execution of its enactment only indirectly - by
passing new legislation.").
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Bowsher v. Synar65 presented the obverse of Buckley. Con-
gress delegated executive budgetary functions to an official in the
legislative branch: the Comptroller General. The Court relied
again on separation of powers principles expounded by the Fram-
ers, and held the delegation of executive functions to an agent of
Congress unconstitutional.66 Similarly, in Morrison v. Olson,67 the
Court applied broad separation of powers principles in its review of
the independent counsel statute.68
Most recently, Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v.
Citizens for the Abatement of Airport Noise69 struck down an Air-
port Authority Board of Review comprised of members of Congress
because it wielded veto power over certain executive functions of
the Authority. The Court once again defined the issue as one of
separation of powers 70 and founded its decision in a structural
analysis of this historic principle.71 Heeding Madison's warnings
that "power is of an encroaching nature" and that "[the legislature]
can with greater facility, mask . . . the encroachments which it
makes,"72 the Court concluded that the Board of Review, even
though it "might prove to be innocuous," 73 was an impermissible
encroachment by the legislature beyond the legislative sphere.
The Court laid out a simple rule: "If the power is executive, the
Constitution does not permit an agent of Congress to exercise it. If
the power is legislative, Congress must exercise it in conformity
with the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Art. I,
§ 7."74
This phalanx of decisions holds in unanimous array that the
separation of powers doctrine prohibits the legislature from ap-
pointing individuals to offices outside of the legislative branch of
government. 75 The decisions rely not on specific provisions of the
65. 478 U.S. at 714 (1986).
66. Id. at 721-27, 733-34.
67. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
68. Id. at 685-96.
69. 501 U.S. 252 (1991).
70. Metropolitan, 501 U.S. at 271.
71. Id. at 272-274.
72. Id. at 277, quoted in The Federalist No. 48, at 334 (James Madison).
73. Id. at 276.
74. Id.
75. A governmental body with members subject to legislative appointment
may only exercise powers "of an investigative and informative nature" such as
those exercised by a congressional committee. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 113 cf Tenney
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federal constitution, but on elemental tenets of American democ-
racy that Rhode Island presumably shares. "Legislative power...
is the authority to make laws, but not to enforce them or appoint
the agents charged with the duty of such enforcement." 76 Or, as
Chief Justice Marshall more generally observed: "It is the peculiar
province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the gov-
ernment of society; the application of those rules to individuals in
society would seem to be the duty of other departments."77
3. THE LOCAL ROAD: SEPARATION OF POWERS IN RHODE ISLAND
GOVERNMENT.
A. Smooth Travel: Rhode Island Following the Federal
Constitutional Model of Separate Government Powers.
Article V of the Rhode Island Constitution, "Of the Distribu-
tion of Powers," states: "The powers of the government shall be
distributed into three departments: the legislative, executive and
judicial." Articles VI, "Of the Legislative Power," VII, "Of the
House of Representatives," and VIII, "Of the Senate," vest the leg-
islative power in and establish the composition of the houses of the
General Assembly. Article IX, "Of the Executive Power," vests the
"chief executive power" of the state in the governor and, like the
United States Constitution, commands the governor to "take care
that the laws be faithfully executed." This article also establishes
the powers and duties of our other constitutional executive officers:
the secretary of state; the attorney general; and the general treas-
urer. Article X vests the judicial power of the state in our supreme
court, and provides for establishment by the legislature of lower
courts.
v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951). In Stockman v. Leddy, 129 P. 220 (1912),
a case quoted with approval in Springer, the Supreme Court of Colorado provided
the following limits on bodies appointed by the legislature:
[T]he investigation which [the legislature] authorizes, and the ascertain-
ment of facts which it proposes, are to aid it in future legislation, or to
assist it in its legislative capacity in supplying a remedy for some existing
evil, or to furnish such information as a guide to the attorney general, or
some other appropriate officer of the executive department, in the per-
formance of his duties.
Id. at 30-31. Further the legislative branch may not go.
76. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 140 (quoting Springer, 277 U.S. at 189).
77. Fletcher v. Peck, (6 Cranch) 10 U.S. 87, 136 (1810), cited in Chadha, 462
U.S. at 967.
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There are only minor textual differences between the separa-
tion of powers provisions of our state's constitution and the federal
constitution, and they are not of great significance. 78 In addition
to the textual similarity, both constitutions trace their separation
of powers principles back to the same fundamental wellsprings of
democracy: the writings of John Locke and Charles de Montes-
quieu; the Founding Fathers' constitutional debates; and The Fed-
eralist Papers. More obviously, the federal constitution preceded
78. The primary differences are three in number:
(1.) There is no single "Distribution of Powers" Clause in the United States
Constitution to equate to Article V of the Rhode Island Constitution. This specific
clause in the Rhode Island Constitution provides additional emphasis to the sepa-
ration of powers, a point left implicit in the United States Constitution.
Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 629-630.
(2.) Article II Section 2 of the United States Constitution provides that the
president "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the
supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments
are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but
the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they
think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of De-
partments." There is no similar "Appointments Clause" in the Rhode Island
Constitution.
However, simply separating the governmental powers implicitly removes the
constitutional propriety of legislative appointments. Springer, 277 U.S. at 201-
202. The most recent appointments decision from the Supreme Court, for in-
stance, expressly eschews analysis under the Appointments Clause, and stands its
analysis exclusively on our common principle of separation of the governmental
powers. Metropolitan, 501 U.S. at 277 n.23 (1991).
(3.) Finally, the Rhode Island Constitution vests in the governor the "chief"
executive power. R.I. Const. Art. IX; see Taylor & Co. v. R.G. & J.T. Place, 4 R.I.
324, 354 (1856). The sensible reading of the limitation "chief," if indeed it is a limi-
tation, is that it reflects the independent election within the state's executive
branch of the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, and the General Treasurer.
The equivalent offices are appointed by the President in the federal government.
See R.I. Const. Art. IX, § 12; In re House of Representatives, 575 A.2d at 179.
The key, in any event, is not the executive power, but the legislative power.
The Dorr court held that the clause "[tihe General Assembly shall continue to exer-
cise the powers they have heretofore exercised, unless prohibited in this Constitu-
tion," means legislative powers, since the separation of powers clause prohibits
other than legislative powers to it. In re Dorr, 3 R.I. 299, 304 (1854). The separa-
tion of governmental powers principle does not confide all appointment powers in
the executive, or the chief executive. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 690-91, 695.
Rather it forbids the appointment power to the legislative branch. Fed. Election
Comm'n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d at 826-827; see also John Devlin,
Toward a State Constitutional Analysis of Allocation of Powers: Legislators and
Legislative Appointees Performing Administrative Functions, 66 Temp. L. Rev.
1205, 1265 ("differences in the respective texts of various state constitutions" exist,
but have not "proven to be outcome determinative in the cases.").
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the Rhode Island constitution by more than half a century, and
was likely its model.
Rhode Island is not bound by the federal constitution to follow
federal separation of powers doctrine. 79 But Rhode Island shows
great deference to federal separation of powers jurisprudence and,
nearly invariably, Supreme Court of Rhode Island decisions have
applied federal separation of powers analysis.80 In In re Advisory
Opinion to the Governor,81 the court adhered to the view that, "the
doctrine [of separation of powers] is an inherent and integral ele-
ment of the republican form of government and as an element
thereof is expressly guaranteed to the states by the Guaranty
Clause."8 2
Were it not an advisory opinion,83 this decision would appear
to mandate application of federal jurisprudence through the repub-
lican form of government guarantee of Article IV, Section 4 of the
United States Constitution. Thus, even Rhode Island Supreme
79. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957); Weeks v. Personnel
Board of Review, 373 A.2d 176, 177 (1977); 1 George Sutherland, Statutes and
Statutory Construction § 3.02 (4th ed., 1985 Revision).
80. Older Rhode Island separation of powers cases that turned to the princi-
ples of the federal constitution and the Founding Fathers for guidance include In
re Dorr, 3 R.I. 299 (1854); Taylor & Co. v. R.G. & J.T. Place, 4 R.I. 324 (1856); and
Gorham v. Robinson, 57 R.I. 1 (1936). Recent cases include Chang v. University of
Rhode Island, 375 A.2d 925 (1977), where the court turned to federal precedent to
determine whether the governor could by executive order override a directive of
the legislature. The court accepted:
that the relevant provision of our constitution have the same meaning as
the comparable provisions of the Federal Constitution, and . . . that fed-
eral cases dealing with executive power establish standards by which to
measure the power of the Governor to issue executive orders on Fair Em-
ployment Practices.
Id. Accordingly, the court looked to federal jurisprudence as the "appropriate ana-
lytical framework for determining the extent of executive power." Id.; see also
State v. Jacques, 554 A.2d 193, 196 (R.I. 1989) (quoting Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d
408 (9th Cir. 1980) aff'd, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)). In re House of
Representatives (Special Prosecutor), 575 A.2d 176 (R.I. 1990), adverted to the fed-
eral constitution separation of powers framework and then stated: "The principle
of separation of powers is also mandated by Rhode Island's Constitution. Article V
provides, 'The powers of government shall be distributed into three departments:
the legislative, executive and judicial.'" Id. at 178 (emphasis added).
81. 612 A.2d 1 (R.I. 1992).
82. Id. at 18 (citations omitted).
83. An advisory opinion obtained pursuant to R.I. Const. Art. X, Section 3 does
not constitute a decision of the court, does not finally determine any question, and
has no binding effect on any person whose legal rights are involved. Opinion to the
Governor, 149 A.2d 341 (1959).
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Court decisions urge the road of federal jurisprudence on separa-
tion of powers issues. But as we shall see, this road has diverged.
B. Divergence: Rhode Island Legislative Appointments
Decisions.
In one specific area of separation of powers doctrine, we en-
counter a divergence in the road. This area is the General Assem-
bly's power to appoint to offices outside the legislature. In this
area, the Rhode Island Supreme Court's decisions are troubled.
In recent cases, where legislative appointments have been
questioned, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has avoided reaching
the issue,8 4 or has found itself unable to render a constitutional
decision.8 5 In older decisions, as to legislative appointments the
court has said in dicta that "[tihe executive power had been nomi-
nal, merely under the charter, and the constitution extends it very
little"8 6 that the legislature "holds the purse, and, under our con-
stitution, appoints as well as pays"8 7 and that the executive's "offi-
cial power, under our constitution, amounts to nothing."8 8
Subsequently, the court described the background of the 1842 con-
stitutional convention as follows:
Those who had the political power did not want to surrender
the old royal charter... by which the legislature had become
the supreme power in the State. They looked askance upon a
84. Easton's Point Ass'n. v. Coastal Resources Management Council, 552 A.2d
199 (R.I. 1989). Easton's Point avoided the constitutional separation of powers is-
sue on the theory that the judge below, who had raised the constitutional issue sua
sponte, erred in doing so because the parties had waived the separation of powers
objection by appearing voluntarily before the commission. Id. at 202. The court's
waiver rationale appears ill-founded. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Schorr, 478 U.S. at 850-851 (in separation of powers cases, "notions of
consent and waiver cannot be dispositive"); cf Freytag v. Comm'n of Internal Reve-
nue, 501 U.S. 868 (holding that taxpayers did not waive challenge under Appoint-
ments Clause because this was a structural constitutional objection); Welcher v.
Sobol, 636 N.Y.S.2d 421 (holding that a failure to object at an administrative hear-
ing did not waive a constitutional challenge because the challenge went to the stat-
ute itself).
85. In re Comm'n on Judicial Tenure and Discipline, 670 A.2d 1232 (R.I.
1996).
86. Taylor, 4 R.I. 324 at 349-351
87. Id. at 354.
88. Id. at 343.
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constitution that would reduce this department to a plane of
equality with the executive and judicial departments. s 9
With a bare majority, and over a spirited dissent that to modern
readers appears to have the better of the argument, the court then
produced its own dictum, stating that those political power brokers
"stoutly refused... to vest the executive department with full ex-
ecutive powers."90
These vintage dicta are irrelevant to the specific holdings in
the cases in which they appeared 91 and produce irreconcilable in-
ternal conflicts and flaws.9 2 Beyond the internal contradictions,
89. Gorham, 57 R.I. at 22.
90. Id. at 23.
91. Dicta, we know, can fall out of even famous decisions. Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), had its "general expressions" chopped back
in Cohens v. Comm'n of Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). See Humphrey's
Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 627. Myers underwent similar treatment at the hands of
Humphrey's Ex'r. The Court's remedial surgery on the Myers opinion took the
form of "putting aside dicta, which may be followed if sufficiently persuasive but
which are not controlling." Id. The Court stated:
These opinions examine at length the historical, legislative and judicial
data bearing upon the question, beginning with what is called 'the deci-
sion of 1789' in the first Congress and coming down almost to the day
when the opinions were delivered. They occupy 243 pages of the volume
in which they are printed. Nevertheless, the narrow point actually de-
cided was only that the President had power to remove a postmaster of
the first class, without the advice and consent of the Senate as required by
act of Congress. In the course of the opinion of the court, expressions oc-
cur which ... are beyond the point involved and, therefore, do not come
within the rule of stare decisis. In so far as they are out of harmony with
the views here set forth, these expressions are disapproved.
Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 626. The Court also quoted the following passage
from the Cohens decision, which trimmed the reach of Marbury:
It is a maxim, not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every
opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expres-
sions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but
ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit, when the very
point is presented for decision. The reason of this maxim is obvious. The
question actually before the Court is investigated with care, and consid-
ered in its full extent. Other principles which may serve to illustrate it,
are considered in their relation to the case decided, but their possible
bearing on all other cases is seldom completely investigated. Humphrey's
Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 627, quoting Cohens, (6 Wheat) 19 U.S. at 399.
92. The Taylor court's stated fear of the legislature and its "impetuous vor-
tex," Taylor, 4 R.I. at 355, belies Gorham's assertion that: "The framers of our
State constitution entertained no such fears of the general assembly. On the con-
trary.... they trusted that department more than the others." Gorham, 57 R.I. at
28. Cf Myers, 272 U.S. at 123.
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the principles of Montesquieu and the Founding Fathers93 simply
cannot be reconciled with the Gorham and Taylor dicta. The
United States Supreme Court and the Rhode Island Supreme
Court have too often said that the federal and state constitutions
are comparable. 94
Confusion and conflict in the older decisions, paralysis in re-
cent decisions; what is it about the legislative appointment power
that has so confounded the Rhode Island court? The explanation
may lie behind Chief Justice Holmes' aphorism that "a page of his-
tory is worth a volume of logic."9 5
C. "Great Discrepancy": Rhode Island's Constitutional History.
i. The Appointment Power.
The General Assembly had near-absolute authority before the
Rhode Island Constitution was adopted in 1842, and "vast appoin-
tive power."96 Indeed, the General Assembly on extraordinary oc-
Elsewhere the Gorham court denied that dissatisfaction with the general as-
sembly's power over the judiciary "played any part in the agitation for constitu-
tional reform which finally resulted in our present constitution." Gorham, 57 R.I.
at 12. Taylor, on the other hand, spoke of "the evils of this unhallowed union of
judicial and legislative powers in one body," Taylor, 4 R.I. at 342, and asserted that
an "independent, responsible judiciary" was an "inestimable treasure" to which
"the people of this state have been steadily advancing. . . until, in the constitution
adopted a by them only in 1843, they supposed that they held it firmly and se-
curely in their grasp." Id. at 343.
Taylor said in one place, "No jealousy of [the executive branch], or of its as-
sumption by the enterprising and all absorbing legislative department of the gov-
ernment, did, or could exist." Taylor, 4 R.I. at 349-351. It said in another: "The
constitution was set up ... to rescue, though the aid of the judicial department, the
powers of that and the other department ofgovernment from the eddying current of
[the legislature's] 'impetuous vortex.'" Id. at 355 (emphasis added).
93. See supra Part 2.A.
94. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 140; Springer, 277 U.S. at 201; Chang, 118
R.I. at 638. The Taylor court itself stated that the separation of powers principle
has been illustrated and enforced "in the federal constitution, and in every state
constitution of these United States," Taylor, 4 R.I. at 342, that "the different pow-
ers of government ... under our political systems, federal and state, are, without
exception, carefully distributed between the legislative, the executive and the judi-
cial departments." Id. at 332 (emphasis added). In re Advisory Opinion to the Gov-
ernor, 612 A.2d at 18, reported the view that "the doctrine of separation of powers
is extremely important and fundamental to both federal and state governments."
Id.
95. See New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
96. Patrick Conley, Democracy in Decline 37 (1977).
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casion appointed the governor. 97 The General Assembly deposed
the Loyalist-leaning Governor-elect and recognized the Deputy
Governor in his stead in 1775 in furtherance of the Revolution
against England, 98 and in 1806 in Grand Committee, the General
Assembly appointed an "acting governor."99 Additionally the Gen-
eral Assembly chose the Governor in 1890 when none of the candi-
dates received a majority of the popular vote.100
The General Assembly was a unicameral body, of which the
governor was a member, under the Charter of 1663.101 All the
powers of government were exercised by the General Assembly
since the governor and judges 10 2 were all members. In 1696, the
General Assembly first sat in two houses, and the governor then
sat as a member of the house of magistrates - later to become the
Senate.' 03 In 1901, the governor still presided in the Senate,
though no longer a member. 10 4
The appointment power wielded by the General Assembly was
yielded slowly and reluctantly. After the governor was no longer a
member, an appointments statute kept close control in the legisla-
ture. Under the Brayton Act of 1901, if the governor's appointee
did not obtain consent of the Senate in three days, the Senate could
make its own election to the office.' 05 This measure was repealed
as part of the "Bloodless Revolution" of 1935. Only then did the
governor obtain substantial and independent appointive power,
but the General Assembly shared rather than yielded this power,
maintaining appointments to many non-legislative offices to this
day.
97. Dorr, 3 R.I. at 309.
98. C. Carroll, Rhode Island: Three Centuries of Democracy 98, 194 (1932).
99. Conley, supra note 96 at 176.
100. Carroll, supra note 98 at 660.
101. Id. at 465.
102. As a judicial body under the Charter, the General Assembly heard appeals
from trials at which the Governor and his assistants had presided. Conley, supra
note 96 at 40-43; Carroll, supra note 98 at 195, 226. In 1729, the Governor, Dep-
uty Governor, and his Assistants were formally established as a Superior Court of
Judicature, id. at 229, and election of the chief justice and four associate justices
by the Grand Committee began in 1746-47. Id. at 744. At one point, the offices of
Governor and Chief Justice were occupied by the same person. Id. at 226.
103. Conley, supra note 96 at 39; Carroll, supra note 98 at 194, 468.
104. Carroll, supra note 98 at 718.
105. Id. at 720.
1996] APPOINTMENTS BY THE LEGISLATURE
Rhode Island's halting steps towards the American model of
separated powers reflect the "great discrepancy between the affir-
mation of the need to separate the several governmental depart-
ments and the actual political practice the state governments
followed." 106 They also clearly reflect the General Assembly's "te-
nacity in clinging to what has once been gained."10 7
ii. Legislative Power Over the State's Supreme Court.
The Taylor decision of 1856 followed the period of greatest
political upheaval in Rhode Island history. The "Dorr War"'08
ended in the summer of 1842, and the state's new constitution,
which dramatically expanded the franchise, was ratified in
1843.109 Feelings ran high surrounding the adoption of the state
constitution. In the "abortive and farcical" Dorr war, 110 two lives
were lost,"' Dorr himself was jailed for treason, 112 and request
was even made to the United States government to intervene mili-
tarily in Rhode Island and put down the Dorr rebellion. 113 These
issues smoldered into the next decade and in 1854 reform Demo-
crats in the legislature revoked Dorr's conviction. 114
Additionally, an anti-immigrant, anti-Catholic movement
called the Know-Nothings"15 that grew in reaction to the new polit-
106. Wood, supra note 23 at 153-154.
107. Bryce, supra note 23 at 303.
108. The Dorr War was a brief conflict that erupted at the conclusion of bitter
political struggle over a new constitution that would extend the franchise beyond
the predominantly rural landholders who controlled the political process. Thomas
Dorr led a "people's convention" that adopted a new constitution. The General As-
sembly responded with a less radical constitution of its own. An effort by Dorr to
take an armory and enforce the people's constitution caused this political conflict
to be called a war. Dorr's arrest and conviction for treason, the irregularity of his
trial, and a brutal life sentence to solitary imprisonment at hard labor, "ma[d]e
him seem a martyr." Hoffman and Hoffman, Brotherly Love: Murder and the Poli-
tics of Prejudice in Nineteenth Century Rhode Island 81 (1993); Carroll, supra note
98 at 506. Dorr was eventually released after less than two years. See generally
W.F. McLoughlin, Rhode Island: A History 129-137; Carroll, supra note 98 at 483-
511, 579-581; Dorr, 3 R.I. at 299.
109. See Carroll supra note 98 at 472, 474, 475.
110. Conley, supra note 96 at 350.
111. Carroll, supra note 98 at 498.
112. Id. at 507
113. Id. at 492-3, 508.
114. McLoughlin, supra note 108 at 36.
115. The name of this group was derived from the supposed pledge of its mem-
bers; who, if asked about the organization would say "I know nothing."
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ical arrivals "reached a peak in Rhode Island in the early 1850s" 116
and swept out the reform Democrats to take over the General As-
sembly in 1855.117 This episode is described by McLoughlin as "a
prime example of 'the paranoid style' in American politics."' 18
The Taylor Court of 1856 would not under the prevailing real-
politik likely have been willing to inject into this turbulence an un-
welcome restructuring of the legislature's habitual powers. At the
time, the justices served by legislative grace. Indeed, in September
of 1853, the reform Democrats of the House of Representatives had
voted to remove the judges of the Supreme Court by declaring their
seats vacant. The justices were spared only by Senate opposition
to the purge. 11 9 The political lesson could not have been lost on the
justices.
The Gorham court of 1936 was appointed in the greatest polit-
ical upheaval in Rhode Island since the Dorr War: the "Bloodless
Revolution" of 1935. All five of the new judges' predecessors were
sacked. 120 The five new judges who decided Gorham served at the
will and pleasure of the legislature 21 and were naturally allied
with their patrons in the new legislative majority. With the seats
of their sacked predecessors practically still warm, they could have
seen little value in provoking the General Assembly.
116. McLoughlin, supra note 98 at 141.
117. Id. at 142. The Dorr War, Irish Immigration and Know-Nothingism were
closely related.
This movement for reform of the state constitution coincided with
events in Ireland that led to a vast increase in the number of Irish immi-
grants to the United States in the 1840s, particularly in Massachusetts
and Rhode Island, changing an old homogeneous Protestant Yankee cul-
ture to a heterogenous (sic) one.
Hoffman and Hoffman, supra note 108 at xii. William McLoughlin notes that
"[miuch of the tension in the Dorr War stemmed from the anti-Irish and anti-Cath-
olic feeling among Dorr's opponents." McLoughlin, supra note 108 at 139-140.
Historians Patrick Conley and Matthew Smith, who are to be credited with much
of the original research in this area, relate that "the Yankees of 1855 saw the Irish
as a threat to traditional American institutions and values," and that the outcome
in the political arena was "turbulent conflict between Yankee and Celt." Patrick
Conley and Matthew Smith, Catholicism in Rhode Island: The Formative Era 81,
83.
118. McLoughlin, supra note 108 at 139-140.
119. Carroll, supra note 98 at 581.
120. Patrick Conley, Album of Rhode Island History 1636-1986 166; McLough-
lin, supra note 108 at 202.
121. Mcloughlin, supra note 108 at 202.
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The Taylor and Gorham decisions must be read in this histori-
cal context, and in light of an incident provoked in 1787 by the case
of Trevett v. Weeden. 122 Although the actual holding of this case
was quite mild, the arguments "sustained an impression in the
public mind that the Superior Court had defied the General As-
sembly." 123 The General Assembly took umbrage and the justices
were promptly haled before the legislature to show cause. Four of
the five Justices appeared, and endorsed the general proposition of
an independent judiciary with a duty to God higher than to the
General Assembly. 124 "[A]t the next election the General Assem-
bly removed the offending justices from office." 125
In seeking an explanation for judicial decisions that are so con-
founded where legislative appointments are at issue, one must rec-
ognize the political value to the General Assembly of these
appointments. In this vein, it is impossible to ignore the General
Assembly's tradition of sacking offending justices, the practical re-
gard for the power of the General Assembly this must have in-
stilled, and the legislature's recognized "tenacity in clinging to
what has once been gained." 26
4. "IF MEN WERE ANGELS": WHY THIS MATTERS TO RHODE
ISLAND
"If men were angels, no government would be necessary,"
wrote James Madison.' 27 "In framing a government which is to be
administered by men over men," he wrote, properly separated pow-
ers supply "by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better mo-
tives."128 For those close to government, it is sometimes hard to
see how these "opposite and vital interests" are of practical utility.
The terms of 18th century political discourse, such as "liberty" and
"tyranny" and "corruption," may not resonate for all of us.
122. This decision predated reporting cases in Rhode Island, and is primarily of
historical interest. The arguments engaging the novel principle of judicial review
were widely circulated. Carroll, supra note 98 at 745.
123. Id. at 745.
124. Id.
125. Id. Carroll concluded that after this decision, "[there would be no reason
to sustain a lingering doubt.., that the General Assembly had justified its rights
to be called an omnipotent legislature." Id.
126. Bryce, supra note 24 at 297.
127. The Federalist No. 51 at 262-263 (James Madison).
128. Id. at 262-263.
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Of course, we can simply take the Founders' word for it, if we
find James Madison, Thomas Jefferson and George Washington
credible. 129 But we also have a clear example of one of the most
practical of the checks and balances, legislative oversight, that is a
sacrifice to these legislative appointments.
Healthy rivalry between the branches permits the legislature
to be what Bryce called "a jealous observer and restrainer of the
others."130 The United States Supreme Court has described legis-
lative oversight as "an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function,"'131 and noted, "[tihe power of Congress to
conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process. That
power is broad.... It comprehends probes into departments of the
Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or
waste."'132
Congress' power to inquire into and publicize corruption, mal-
administration or inefficiency in agencies of the government was
described by President Woodrow Wilson as a function of Congress
to "be preferred even to its legislative function." 133 The long and
often proud history of legislative investigations reaches back into
the mists of English parliamentary history 3 4 and includes in mod-
ern times examples such as the Watergate Committee of 1973, the
Senate Labor Rackets Committee of 1959, the Kefauver Committee
of 1950-1951 and the Truman Committee of 1942-1944, in addition
to the notorious Committee on Un-American Activities. Arthur
Schlesinger said, "Legislative inquiries have informed, enlight-
ened, entertained, confused, divided, and at times even demoral-
ized the republic." 35 However, the better spirit of legislative
oversight is embodied in the following statement of a legislator:
129. See supra Part 2.A.
130. Bryce, supra note 24 at 407.
131. McGrain v. Dougherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927).
132. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
133. Id. at 200 n.33.
134. See James Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power
of Investigation, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 153 (1926). See also Watkins, 354 U.S. 178; Mc-
Grain, 273 U.S. 135. The author is aware of no such similar history of legislative
inquiries in Rhode Island, except after disaster. E.g., Select Commission to Inves-
tigate the Failure of RISDIC-Insured Financial Institutions (after failure of the
institutions); House Judiciary Committee Investigation Into Impeachment of the
Chief Justice (after photographs of chief justice at motel were published in the
Providence Journal Bulletin).
135. Quoted in Congress: Internal Investigator, Prov. J. Bull. (July 24, 1994).
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Sir, it is our duty to make this inquiry. The public money is
expended on these establishments; the labor of the nation
supports them. We extract money from the pockets of the
people to appropriate to these purposes, and it is proper to
ascertain that those who reap the earnings of the people are
worthy of the public confidence. 136
Although legislative inquiries have been and can be abused, they
are an important mechanism in our checks and balances of govern-
ment. Where legislative appointees lead and oversee the depart-
ments and agencies of the other branches of government, this
mechanism is compromised.137
5. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS PRINCIPLE IN OTHER STATES
The United States Supreme Court stated in Kilbourn v.
Thompson:
The increase in the number of states, in their population and
wealth, and in the amount of power, if not in its nature to be
exercised by the [government], presents powerful and grow-
ing temptations to those to whom that exercise is intrusted,
to overstep the just boundaries of their own department, and
enter upon the domain of one of the others, or to assume pow-
ers not intrusted to either of them.138
This section reviews how other state courts have responded to
those "powerful and growing temptations" and overcome the "great
discrepancy" 13 9 between constitutional theory and local practice.
In State ex rel. Wallace v. Bone,' 40 the Supreme Court of
North Carolina set forth a partial list of states' 4 ' endorsing the
136. Landis, supra note 129 at 174.
137. Other writers have also noted the importance of legislative oversight. See,
e.g., Ronald Claveloux, The Conflict Between Executive Privilege and Congressional
Oversight: The Gorsuch Controversy, 1983 Duke L. J. 1333, 1339 ("Congress by
'acquainting itself with the acts and dispositions of the administrative agents of
Government' will be able to uncover corruption, waste, inefficiency.. ."); Theodora
Galacatos, The United States Department of Justice Environmental Crimes Sec-
tion: A Case Study of Inter- and Intrabranch Conflict Over Congressional Oversight
and the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 587, 604 ("Con-
gressional oversight of the executive branch serves important political and consti-
tutional purposes.").
138. 103 U.S. at 191-92.
139. See supra Parts 3A-3B; note 106 and accompanying text.
140. 286 S.E.2d 79 (N.C. 1982).
141. The list in Bone included Indiana, West Virginia, Georgia, Colorado,
Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Wisconsin. Id. But see
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federal approach, concluding: "Numerous decisions from sister
states show strict adherence to the separation of powers principle
and do not tolerate legislative encroachment or control over the
function and power of the executive branch."142 On separation of
powers grounds, the court invalidated several legislative appoint-
ments to the state's Environmental Management Commission.
The court stated, "There should be no doubt that the principle of
separation of powers is a cornerstone of our state and federal
government." 143
Our neighboring Massachusetts in Opinion of the Justices44
held unconstitutional a proposed Electronic Data Processing and
Telecommunications Commission that included members ap-
pointed by the legislative leadership. The court held that the exec-
utive functions performed by the commission precluded either
legislative or judicial appointments to its membership. 145
Thirty years ago, in State ex rel. State Building Comm'n v.
Bailey,146 the West Virginia Supreme Court knocked the president
of the state senate, the speaker of the house of delegates, the mi-
nority leader of the senate and the minority leader of the house of
delegates off of the State Office Building Commission, whose prin-
cipal mission was to issue and sell construction bonds. The court
concluded: "In enacting the statutory provision that members of
the Legislature shall be members of the State Building Commis-
sion the Legislature has attempted to confer executive or adminis-
trative power and impose executive or administrative duties upon
State ex rel. McLeod v. Edwards, 236 S.E.2d 406 (S.C. 1977) (South Carolina State
Budget and Control Board held not to violate separation of powers provision);
State ex rel. Craven v. Schorr, 131 A.2d 158 (Del. 1957) (legislative appointments
to the State Highway Department, the Department of Elections and the Liquor
Commission upheld). See John Devlin, Toward a State Constitutional Analysis of
Allocation of Powers: Legislators and Legislative Appointees Performing Adminis-
trative Functions, 66 Temp. L. Rev. 1205, for a summary of these and other state
court decisions; see also John Orth, Forever Separate and Distinct: Separation of
Powers; North Carolina, 62 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 10-16 (1993) (compiling cases). Legisla-
tive appointments are most commonly upheld where part-time legislatures estab-
lish councils or commissions to sit when the legislature is out of session. Devlin,
supra note 25 at 1205, nn. 198-201 and accompanying text.
142. Bone, 286 S.E.2d at 84.
143. Id. at 84.
144. 309 N.E. 2d 476, 479-80 (Mass. 1974)
145. 309 N.E. 2d. at 480.
146. 151 W.Va. 79, 150 S.E. 2d. 449 (1966).
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the legislative members of the commission which. . . they can not
constitutionally exercise or perform."147
In Greer v. State,148 the Georgia Supreme Court declared
members of the General Assembly ineligible to serve on the 26-
member authority established to construct and operate the Geor-
gia World Congress Center. While admitting that the doctrine of
separation of powers "is not a rigid principle" and should be "suffi-
ciently flexible to permit practical arrangements in a complex gov-
ernment", the court stated, "it is plain to us in this case that the
functions performed by the World Congress Center Authority are
primarily, if not exclusively, executive. 1 49
In Alexander v. State ex rel. Allain,150 the Mississippi
Supreme Court found seven boards and commissions containing
legislative appointments unconstitutional, including a Commission
of Budget and Accounting, Board of Economic Development, Board
of Trustees of Public Employees' Retirement System, and Central
Data Processing Authority.
In State ex rel. Schneider v. Bennett,151 the court ousted eight
members who constituted the leadership of the Kansas legislature
from a state finance council created to approve the rules and regu-
lations of the state Department of Administration. The court
found that in theory:
Individual members of the legislature may serve on adminis-
trative boards or commissions where such service falls in the
realm of cooperation on the part of the legislature and there
is no attempt to usurp functions of the executive department
of the government. The separation of powers doctrine prohib-
its individual members of the legislature from serving on ad-
ministrative boards or commissions where such service
results in the usurpation of powers of another department by
the individual legislators.152
147. Bailey, 150 S.E.2d at 456; see also Book v. State Office Bldg. Comm'n, 149
N.E. 2d 273 (1953) (striking members of the legislature off a state building com-
mission); J.F. Ahern Co. v. Wisconsin State Bldg. Comm'n, 336 N.W.2d 679 (Wisc.
App. 1983) (legislative appointments to state building commission spared where
independent statute gave the governor absolute approval authority).
148. 212 S.E.2d 836 (1975).
149. Greer, 212 S.E.2d at 838. See also Parcell v. State, 620 P.2d 834 (Kan.
1980).
150. 441 So.2d 1329, 1345 (Miss. 1983).
151. 547 P.2d 786 (1976); see also Parcell, 620 P.2d 834 (following Schneider).
152. Id. at 792.
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Here, the court found, the council exerted "both directly and indi-
rectly, a coercive influence on that executive department."15 3
Although the record is certainly not unblemished, the majority
of other states that have addressed this issue follow the principle
of American democracy that legislative appointments offend the
fundamental structure of our constitutions.
6. CONCLUSION
James Madison forewarned us that "mere demarcation on
parchment of the constitutional limits of the several departments
is not a sufficient guard against those encroachments which led to
a tyrannical concentration of all the power of government in the
same hands."154
In Rhode Island, the legislature has widely infiltrated the
state's public boards, commissions and corporations. 155 This ex-
tension of legislative power beyond the legislative branch comes at
a price.' 56 Soon, the Rhode Island Supreme Court will be obliged
to define in the structure of our government Rhode Island's parch-
ment demarcation of powers, and will select one of two roads. One
road leads to the broad and sunlit uplands of federal precedent,
and is constructed on the basic and vital principles of our country's
founding. This road enjoys a prospect that is both fairly predict-
able, and largely immune to local political intercession. The state
road, on the other hand, comes from an obscure and troubled ori-
gin; it is complex enough to confound the court even today; and it
leads back into the great swamps of a political history from which
we are still struggling to emerge. With apologies to Robert Frost,
this would seem a poor occasion to "take the road less traveled."
Indisputably, however, the choice will indeed make "all the
difference."
153. 547 P.2d at 797-98.
154. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 797 n.177 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (quoting The Fed-
eralist No. 47 (James Madison)); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. at 698
(Scalia, J. dissenting) (quoting The Federalist No. 73 (Alexander Hamilton)).
155. See infra Appendix, Partial Listing of Rhode Island Agencies with Mem-
bers Appointed by the Legislature.
156. Supra Part 3.D.
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APPENDIX
PARTIAL LISTING OF AGENCIES
WITH MEMBERS APPOINTED BY THE
LEGISLATURE
Economic Development Council. R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-63-5
(1993)
Rhode Island Port Authority and Economic Development
Corporation. Id. § 42-64-8 (1995)
State Building Code Commission. Id. § 23-27.3-100.1.4 (1995)
Water Resources Board. Id. § 46-15.1-2 (1995)
Narragansett Bay Water Quality Management District Com-
mission. Id. § 46-25-6 (1995)
Commission on Judicial Tenure & Discipline. Id. § 8-16-1
(1995)
Public Transit Authority. Id. § 39-18-2 (1990)
Retirement Board. Id. § 36-8-4 (1995)
Rhode Island Lottery Commission. Id. § 42-61-1 (1993)
The Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Corporation. Id.
§ 23-19-6 (1995 Supp.)
Rhode Island Arts and Tourism Commission. Id. § 42-75.1-3
(1995)
Capital Center Commission. 1981 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 332; 1983
R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 167
Governor's Council on Mental Health. R.I. Gen. Laws § 40.1-6-
1 (1995)
Substance Abuse Advisory Council. Id. § 42-50-6 (1993)
Coastal Resources Management Council. Id. § 46-23-2 (1991)
Unclassified Pay Plan Board. Id. § 36-4-16 (1990)
E911 Uniform Emergency Telephone System Authority. Id.
§ 39-21-4 (1990)
Newport Tourism and Convention Authority. 1981 Pub. Laws
ch. 263
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